

## SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY & RESILIENCE PRACTICAL APPLICATION & EXPERIENCE

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# Why Supply Chain Security and Resilience? – Economic Impact!!!!

## Table 1-1 Deaths and Damages of a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on a Major Seaport or Washington DC


Property Damage – Direct	\$50 – 500 Billion
Trade Disruption	\$100 – 200 Billion
Indirect Costs (Direct times multiplier of 2)	\$300 - 1,400 Billion (1.4 Trillion)
Total First Year Costs	Hundreds of Billions to Trillions (not including cost of lives lost)

<sup>\*</sup>Table excerpted from: <u>The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability</u>, Abt Associates, April 30, 2003



### **Crisis Recovery – Supply Chain**

Disruption impact profile (adapted from *The resilient enterprise*, Yossi Sheffi, MIT Press, 2005, p 64)






### Practical Supply Chain Resilience Examples

- Ericsson => Sony Ericsson
  - Slow Reaction to Crisis (2001 US chip manufacturer fire)
  - No Built-In Redundancy (long, thin supply chain)
  - Aggressive, Prepared Competitor Absorbed All Available
     Manufacturing Capacity (Nokia)
- Positive Supply Chain Resilience Examples
  - Regional Transport Mode Redundancy EAC example
  - Multi-supplier Strategy with Option to Ramp-up
  - Switzerland Example Military Vehicles Manufacturing



## **Classic Threat Assessment & Risk Mitigation**





### **Example Threat Portfolio**






# Vulnerability Assessment & Prioritizing Risk Mitigation

Severity class	Severity name	Description of the relevant types of consequences
ı	Catastrophic	events that can result in fatality or system loss, very serious injury for personnel or for the environment, economy
II	Critical	events that can result in serious personal injury, ill health or serious system failure, serious injury to the environment, economy
III	Marginal	events that can result in personal injury, ill health, system failure
IV	Negligible	events that can result in minor personal injury, ill health, minor system failure, minor injury to the environment

Frequency class	Frequency name	Comment on the relevant meanings
Α	Often	events that will occur frequently during the life of the system
В	Possible	events that will occur several times during the life of the system
С	Occasional	events that will probably occur some time during the life of the system
D	Small	events that are unlikely but may occur during the life of the system
E	Unlikely	events where it could be assumed that an incident will not occur during the life of the system

#### Consequence (Severity)



Risk mitigation necessary

Risk mitigation important

Risk mitigation « nice to have »


Risk mitigation costs may outweigh benefits



## The Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) - reduces risk!!!

#### THE AEO COMPACT MODEL

IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS




AEO Certificate Holders will be given the priority for imports / exports / transit in the case of a terrorist attack or catastrophic natural event.

\*NOTE: applies specifically for C-TPAT members in the US

\*from DG TAXUD AEO Compact Model



## **AEO Risk Mapping and Mitigation Process**





### Supply Chain Security Solutions

Detection – Non-intrusive Inspection – Physical Inspection

Track / Trace / Movement Controls

Cargo / Container Integrity

Maritime Cargo

Land-Based Cargo

Air Cargo

Advance Information – Data Capture, Information Management, Access

Systems Interoperability – Exchange of Information (relevant agencies)

Regulatory, Voluntary Compliance, Mutual Reconition and other elements



### EOS (Who)

## 31 Members (from 12 European countries) and more to come

Present Members active in the following sectors

**USER/OPERATOR & SUPPLY COMPANIES** 

RESEARCH & NGOs Institutions

**EU SECTORAL ASSOCIATIONS** 

CIVIL SECURITY & DEFENCE

TRANSPORT & ENERGY

INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION

**FINANCE & SERVICES** 

HEALTH / FOOD / WATER

NUCLEAR / BIO / CHEMICAL













