ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY IN PT

Summary, initial findings and reflections from workshop on 6 April 2016

Jan Politiek,
Chair UITP Security Commission

1 PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION

COORDINATION

Plans and procedures require initiative from PT organisations and authorities

> **PTO**- optional action plans according to threat level to clarify role and potential support from operator during a crisis

> **Authorities**- threat levels should be detailed according to incident scenarios

> Authorities should specify the objective they want to achieve with any order

SECURITY STAFF

Role and responsibility of security staff has to be evaluated

› Attractive job profile

› Adequate training and equipment

› Appropriate role and responsibility

› Corresponding empowerment

If imbalanced – risk of gap between expectation and capacities!

NON-SECURITY STAFF

Operational staff plays important role
- They know the environment
- They are likely to be first on site

Awareness and involvement
- Awareness and clear procedures
- Understand the why
- Active role triggers initiative

Recognition
- Feedback to reward initiative

PASSENGERS

Active role for passengers?

→Realistic expectations needed
  ‣ Awareness campaigns and announcements
  ‣ Emergency numbers
  ‣ Help points
  ‣ Passengers apps

Increased awareness after events, but how long?

2   RESPONSE

INFORMATION

(during an attack somewhere else)

Operators need information, because it helps to evaluate the local situation and need for action

- Also without changes staff information is crucial to maintain confidence
- staff wants to trust management to be involved, informed and share information if available
- Lack of information gives way to speculation and fear

Motivation may be affected

ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT

Operating staff should have an active role in crisis response

Being in charge of something increases confidence and focus

- Passenger evacuation
- Passenger information
- Sweeping a bus at terminus

12th LANDSEC meeting Brussels, 11 April 2016 **UITP**

TRAINING

Training programmes for first line management need to be reviewed

- Security and operational skills

- Staff management and psychological skills

- Communication

3   RECOVERY

UP-/ DOWN-SCALING

Up-scaling

› fast and in line with events

Down-scaling

› Progressively and with plan and reason

Duration of extra measures

› What is reassuring immediately may be disturbing after a while

Risk of repeated attacks

› Without down-scaling there is no room to go up

Exit strategy needs to be planned!

RETURN TO NORMAL

Passengers

› Seem to want to go back to normal as quickly as possible

› They want to know what works and what does not

Staff

› Focus due to active involvement

› Concern comes a bit later

› Return process takes longer

Different communication strategies

RECOVERY OBSERVATIONS

Staff reassurance

- Active involvement of management staff in « field work » is highly appreciated by operational staff
- Community feeling is important for motivation and continuity

Heigthened alertness

- Incidents trigger higher alertness and willingness to report
- Prepare for more information traffic and filter

12th LANDSEC meeting Brussels, 11 April 2016 **UITP**

4 INITIAL CONCLUSIONS AND LOOK AHEAD

PROPORTIONALITY

Create controlled environment

> ❯ CCTV and analytics

> ❯ Awareness and vigilance of staff

No creation of new threats

> ❯ Avoid bottlenecks

> ❯ Avoid displacing the risk

Avoid over-reaction

> ❯ Continuity based on solid procedures and sound training

DECISION MAKING

Authorities need to understand the consequences of decisons affecting public transport

› Disrupted public transport impacts confidence of the public

› Role of public transport is not just target, also tool

› Intervention and support teams rely on public transport for deployment

Traffic collaps and may jeopardise response plans!

12th LANDSEC meeting Brussels, 11 April 2016 **UITP**

TRAINING & COMMUNICATION

› Job profiles and corresponding training need to be appropriate and up-to-date

› Refreshing skills and motivation has to be a focus too

› Role of social media during incidents

  › How to use them as a tool?

  › How to get a grip on communication?

INSIDER THREAT

Growing concern – needs to be addressed

> recruitment process

> active staff

Cooperation with authorities:

> Identification of radicalisation

> Sharing of intelligence

> Background check process

UITP WORK FOCUS

Basic procedures for operational staff

- Suspicious items

- Suspicious behaviour, etc.

Outline basic security plan

- Basis for good practice collection

Criticality analysis of job profiles

Thank you for your attention!

12th LANDSEC meeting Brussels, 11 April 2016   **UITP**